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CORWINt ON THE CONSTITUTION. VOLUME 
THREE: ON LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT. Ed-
ited by Richard Loss.z Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press. 1988. Pp. 258. $31.50. 
SPHERES OF LIBERTY: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS 
OF LIBERTY IN AMERICAN CULTURE. By Michael 
Kammen.3 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1989. 
Pp. xiv, 180. $9.95, paper. 
LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CON-
STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE 
NEW DEAL. Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul4 & Howard 
Dickman.s Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York 
Press. 1989. Pp. 288. $57.50, cloth; $18.95, paper. 
Herbert Hovenkamp 6 
These three books offer widely scattered perspectives on the 
meaning of "liberty" in American legal and political discourse of 
the past two centuries. The Loss edition of Corwin is the third vol-
ume in a series, and reprints a dozen essays that Corwin wrote be-
tween 1912 and 1952. Kammen's Spheres of Liberty is a paperback 
reissue of a book originally published in 1986. Paul's and Dick-
man's Liberty, Property, and Government is a collection of essays, 
some new and some previously published, by constitutional scholars 
and historians. 
Edwin S. Corwin, whose teaching and writings spanned fifty 
years, was one of the great scholars of the American Constitution 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Richard Loss and 
Cornell University Press perform a valuable service by reprinting 
Corwin's constitutional scholarship. Loss's introduction is some-
thing of a disappointment, since it offers little analysis or critique of 
Corwin's theory, and nothing to place Corwin in historical perspec-
tive. But Loss does a rather good job of summarizing the argu-
1. The late Edwin S. Corwin was a Professor of Political Science at Princeton Univer-
sity from 1905 to 1946. 
2. Independent scholar. 
3. Newton C. Farr Professor of American History and Culture, Cornell University. 
4. Deputy Director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Professor of Political 
Science, Bowling Green State University. 
5. Research Associate, Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State 
University. 
6. Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
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ments of the pieces contained in this volume, which include many of 
Corwin's most famous writings on substantive due process and the 
Bill of Rights. 
One of the most memorable of these writings is "Social Plan-
ning under the Constitution," first published in 1932, where Corwin 
carried the progressive critique of substantive due process to its apo-
gee, arguing that the real culprit was John Fiske, the widely read 
popularizer of Herbert Spencer who, Corwin claimed, was responsi-
ble for the Social Darwinism on the Supreme Court. Corwin simul-
taneously attacked both the Supreme Court and the social scientists 
gathered at a meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, where the essay was delivered as an address, for being too pre-
occupied with methodology and models, and not enough with 
function. Social planning, he argued, required less of the former 
and relatively more of the latter. In general, Corwin's critique of 
the pre-New Deal and New Deal Supreme Court focused on its lack 
of tolerance for governmental experimentation-its failure to recog-
nize that, as he put it, "if you would make an omelet you must 
break some eggs." Perhaps most important, Corwin argued that all 
firms who do business in more than one state ought to be considered 
as within the jurisdiction of the federal government under the com-
merce clause, respecting nearly all their activities. Over the next 
decade Corwin became a powerful advocate of federal supremacy in 
economic regulation. 
Kammen's book, originally given as the Curti lectures at the 
University of Wisconsin, is a study of the rhetoric of "liberty" in 
American legal and political discourse. Writing with broad strokes, 
Kammen argues that "liberty" has carried different meanings at dif-
ferent times, and that over time it fit into three models of state pol-
icy and individual right. The first was the notion of liberty and 
authority, and of the sanctity of property rights, that dominated 
early American political thought. The second was the nineteenth 
century model of "ordered" liberty. The third was the explicit asso-
ciation of liberty with concepts of justice and equality that charac-
terize twentieth-century American thought. 
Intermixed with Kammen's essays are several photographs of 
American icons depicting notions of liberty contemporary to the 
period. Most are likenesses of Lady Liberty. Almost no discussion 
of the icons is integrated into the text, but at the end of the book is a 
short note giving factual material on their origin. 
Kammen's book is mainly about elite thought rather than pop-
ular culture, and the icons add little to his arguments. The most 
interesting is LiFran E. Fort's drawing of the head of the Statue of 
412 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:410 
Liberty with obvious African features, "The Other Liberty." But 
the very selection of twentieth-century icons seems to undermine, 
rather than establish, Kammen's case. The nineteenth-century 
icons displaying Lady Liberty are objects of popular culture, such 
as plates and weather vanes. Liberty and equality, or the "alterna-
tive" liberty of discrete and insular minorities, apparently appears 
only in the avant garde. Afro-American statues of liberty have not, 
to the best of my knowledge, become a dime store item. 
Kammen's book can also be faulted for overlooking large 
movements that contributed much to the concept of liberty during 
various periods. For example, there is almost nothing about Scot-
tish "Common Sense" Realism in America, even though today we 
are inclined to believe that it was the most prominent American 
Protestant ideology of the first half of the nineteenth century. The 
Scottish Realists' concept of the "instructed conscience" was an es-
sential part of ordered liberty from the 1760s to at least the time of 
the Civil War. Likewise, Kammen's discussion of the substantive 
due process era is uninspired, largely stating the traditional progres-
sive critique of the period, which has always been inclined to view 
the Supreme Court's statements of liberty of contract as the Liberty 
Bell ringing false. Overall, Kammen lacks a strong sense of the 
place of classical political economy in nineteenth- and early twenti-
eth-century American concepts of liberty. In the nineteenth cen-
tury "liberty" was, if nothing else, an economic concept. 
These oversights may result from the fact that Kammen strives 
so bard to find unified, coherent meanings of "liberty" within each 
era. But liberty as a concept has a spatial, or interest group, dimen-
sion that is at least as important as its temporal dimension. As a 
result, the concept of liberty is less uniform within an era than this 
book suggests. The American labor movement, political econo-
mists, Federalists, Jeffersonians, abolitionists, secessionists, know-
nothings, New Dealers, and Civil Rights activists all have widely 
differing concepts of "liberty" -and the importance of these differ-
ent perspectives often dwarfs the importance of the mere passage of, 
say, fifty years. 
But any book of less than one hundred and eighty pages, given 
as three lectures on a concept as broad as "liberty" over two centu-
ries, is bound to be selective. My criticism may be no more than the 
common reviewer's complaint that he would have selected some dif-
ferent things. Kammen presents an imaginative, coherent outline of 
a concept whose importance lies in its ability to change and to re-
flect the values of widely differing interest groups. 
Not all the essays in Liberty, Property and Government are con-
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cerned primarily with constitutional interpretation before the New 
Deal, as the title implies. For example, Glen 0. Robinson's inter-
esting analysis of "Evolving Conceptions of 'Property' and 'Liberty' 
in Due Process Jurisprudence" includes a lengthy discussion of 
post-New Deal cases and scholarship. The post-New Deal discus-
sion is important to Robinson's point, however: faithfulness to his-
tory in constitutional interpretation does not mean rediscovery of 
an "original" intent, but rather continuity with the past. He argues 
that, yes, history is important in constitutional decisionmaking, but 
the history of thirty or forty years ago is often much more impor-
tant than the history of the constitutional convention or of the ideas 
of eighteenth-century thinkers. 
In an interesting essay Mary Cornelia Porter surveys the schol-
arship about Lochner-orthodox, progressive, and revisionist. As 
she notes, the Progressive critique of the Lochner-era Court gener-
ally assumed a pro-business, anti-labor bias that does not survive 
close scrutiny. More importantly, although Lochner itself may have 
been "dead wrong," "Lochnerizing" with respect to property and 
other constitutional rights is probably unavoidable. In a well 
crafted discussion of economic liberty, Republican values and anti-
trust, Tony Freyer argues that the flexibility inherent in antitrust's 
rule of reason and the ambiguity of the framers' intentions concern-
ing economic matters worked together to give something to every-
one. The combination created a delicate but tenable balance that 
permitted legislators to define the margins of both liberty and eco-
nomic control. In an essay on Republicanism and railroads Alan 
Jones traces the history of both railroad failure and railroad victimi-
zation of shippers such as farmers, and the great debates about the 
need for legislative control. 
Paul L. Murphy's piece on Holmes, Brandeis, Pound and soci-
ological jurisprudence presents the Progressive critique in its purest, 
unrevised form. Murphy appears to assume that all Gilded Age 
and Progressive era economic regulation was in the public interest, 
and that the Supreme Court was tinged with an anti-labor, pro-busi-
ness, classical economic bias that led it to undermine such statutes 
or construe them narrowly. This view is conventional, and not 
wholly mistaken. But it fails to account for the many regulations 
that were upheld, and for the evidence that at least some of these 
regulations had important, harmful effects-not merely on the 
propertied classes, but on others as well. In a similar vein, an essay 
by Harold M. Hyman on judicial protection of property rights dur-
ing the Reconstruction era traces the traditional story of the 
Supreme Court's weakening of the Civil War Amendments, culmi-
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nating in the infamous 1873 decision in the Slaughter-House Cases. 
The result, he argues, is that by the end of Reconstruction (1875) 
the amendments had come to mean far less than the Lincoln vision 
for them during the Civil War period. 
Undoubtedly the most controversial essay in this collection is 
Richard A. Epstein's "The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power," 
which argues that federal power asserted under the commerce 
clause should be limited to activities that actually involve two or 
more states, such as interstate movement. Epstein would roll back 
interpretation of the commerce clause to something resembling its 
status at the tum of the century or earlier. Using largely doctrinal 
analysis, he argues first that "commerce" was intended to refer only 
to trade or transportation among the states. Surprisingly, Epstein 
does not include even a single reference to his great and equally 
controversial predecessor at Chicago, William W. Crosskey, who in 
Politics and the Constitution argued at great length that the natural 
meaning of "commerce" in the late eighteenth century was "things 
commercial"-or all sorts ofbusiness activities, including manufac-
turing and labor relationships. 1 Surely Crosskey has not been so 
thoroughly discredited that his name is no longer even worth men-
tioning in this debate. Likewise, Epstein can be faulted for ignoring 
some important decisions. For example, he fails to mention the 
tum-of-the-century opinion by Justice Peckham, the champion of 
Lochner, in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States,s which 
held that the commerce power trumps liberty of contract. Thus the 
Sherman Act permitted Congress to condemn price-fixing among 
manufacturers (not transporters), even though the right of private 
parties to agree about price lay at the heart of freedom of contract. 
Elsewhere in this volume Harry N. Scheiber counters Epstein's 
work. Looking principally at eminent domain, Scheiber argues that 
the regulatory state was much more pervasive and robust in early 
American history than Epstein admits. The new classicists do not 
have history on their side. 
In one sense these are extremely different books. Corwin was a 
constitutional scholar and historian writing almost exclusively 
about Supreme Court decisions and entirely in the language of law-
yers. Kammen is a cultural historian looking at a much more eclec-
tic array of sources, only one of which is judicial opinions. The 
authors collected in Liberty, Property and Government represent a 
mixed assortment of methods and ideologies. 
7. 1 W. CROSSKEY, PoLmCS AND THE CONmON IN THE HJSfORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 84-114 (1953). 
8. 175 u.s. 211, 228-30 (1899). 
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But what comes through all three books is the clear thesis that 
many forms of American discourse have exhibited a rhetoric of 
"liberty," and that the rhetoric of lawyers and judges is not all that 
different from the rhetoric of slaves, preachers, legislators, presi-
dents, popular authors, and people of letters. Corwin often criti-
cized the Supreme Court for reading its particular concept of liberty 
(such as "liberty of contract") into the Constitution. But clearly 
there are many concepts of liberty, the Constitution permits a range 
of concepts, and-in that respect at least-one concept is perhaps 
as good as another. Inevitably, the Court will read some concept of 
liberty into the Constitution. 
This is not to say that Corwin was wrong in rejecting the 
Court's effort to tie "liberty" to freedom from economic regulation 
during the substantive due process era. But, as both Kammen and 
Porter argue, the twentieth-century concept that ties liberty closely 
to substantive ideas about equality and justice is no closer to the 
concept of liberty that prevailed at the time the Constitution was 
written. The Supreme Court of the turn of the century knew, as 
does Epstein, that liberty of contract produces inequalities of power 
and wealth, but the Justices nevertheless wanted people to be "free" 
to pursue their own welfare without restraint. Alexander Hamilton 
made a similar argument to the Constitutional Convention.9 
Kammen's discussion of Corwin's own accommodation of "lib-
erty" and "equality" is incisive.w In the early 1940s Corwin argued 
that liberty and equality must be juxtaposed against each other-
one could have more of one only by having less of the other. Thus 
the governmental function was always to balance the two against 
each other. But a decade later Corwin professed to find no such 
tension. Liberty and equality traveled in tandem, the right to equal 
treatment by the state being liberty's most important ingredient. 
On the question of liberty, Corwin himself had become a non-
interpretivist. 
9. Kammen at 42. 
10. /d. at 168-69. 
